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Variety in U.S. Kinship Practices, Substantive Due 
Process Analysis and the Right to Marry 
C. Quince Hopkins* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When attending the Supreme Court oral argument in State v. 
Lawrence,1 one could not help but think about the lawyers who argued, 
the Justices who listened, and the parties and people affected by Loving 
v. Virginia2 and Bowers v. Hardwick.3 It could be argued that the 
Lovings succeeded, while Mr. Hardwick did not, in part because the 
Lovings made a deep emotional and psychological appeal, one grounded 
in fairness, but as importantly, one grounded in a form of cognitive 
dissonance theory. That is, if one reads the brief filed on behalf of the 
Lovings, one finds an implicit argument that to declare the Virginia law 
constitutional would be to side with, validate, and support racism.4 
Hardwick’s lawyers, by contrast, focused on purely legalistic arguments 
without making the moral and emotional claim, as well as framing their 
argument as a rights issue and equating a validation of the Georgia 
statute with discrimination. Perhaps that was strategically necessary for 
success when Hardwick was briefed and argued.5 As evidenced by the 
 
This paper was presented at “The Future of Marriage and Claims for Same-Sex Unions Symposium” 
on August 29, 2003 at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, on the campus of Brigham Young 
University.  The article is part of this special symposium issue and the views expressed herein are 
those of the author and do not represent the views of the Journal of Public Law, the J. Reuben Clark 
Law School, or Brigham Young University. 
* Assistant Professor, Washington and Lee University School of Law. The assistance of the Frances 
Lewis Law Center, Washington and Lee University is gratefully acknowledged. I would like to 
thank William N. Eskridge, Jr., David Chambers, Martha Ertman, and participants at the J. Reuben 
Clark Brigham Young University Symposium, The Future of Same-Sex Marriage, on August 29, 
2003 for their helpful comments. 
 1. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
 2. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 3. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 4. See generally, LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975). 
 5. This particular point was first brought to my attention by a student paper written for a 
seminar I teach on Gender, Sexuality and Law. See Andrea Coleman, Cognitive Dissonance Theory: 
A Case Study of Loving v. Virginia and Bowers v. Hardwick (2003) (manuscript on file with the 
author). 
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significant limitation and repeal of many state sodomy laws during the 
nearly 20 years between Hardwick and Lawrence, however, the cultural 
and social milieu perhaps enabled the attorneys for Garner and Lawrence 
to argue their claim more directly as a matter of human rights. This 
human rights claim is explicit in the Garner/Lawrence briefs, which 
clearly link the criminalization of private, intimate same-sex conduct 
between consenting adults to the panoply of rights, such as the right to 
intimate association and marriage, that are associated with and necessary 
to human flourishing as so eloquently described by Martha Nussbaum.6 
At oral argument, counsel for Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Garner eloquently 
addressed the law, but again made the argument that the issue was one of 
basic human rights, a point picked up on and embraced by Justice Souter, 
who joined the majority opinion of the case.7 Texas’ brief and oral 
argument, by contrast, not only lacked legal coherence,8 the brief and 
counsel’s argument also exhibited emotional sterility.9 The same cannot 
be said about most arguments for or against same-sex marriage. Most 
arguments tend to be emotional and unevenly balanced.10 What is needed 
is some intellectually stable ground in an area where both sides of the 
 
 6. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1999). 
 7. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). See Brief filed on Behalf of Lawrence and 
Geddes, (arguing that the issue is one of human rights). 
 8. That Texas also failed to make solid legal arguments was evidenced both by comments 
from the Justices, and news commentary following the arguments. Justice Scalia, for instance, felt 
compelled to make the arguments for Texas when Texas’ legal counsel seemed to founder. 
 9. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). See Brief filed on Behalf of State of Texas. 
 10. Debates over marriage status exhibit the greatest polarization. In this symposium, for 
instance, the majority of participants argued that marriage status should be reserved only for 
opposite sex couples, without exception, typically referring to religious and natural law arguments in 
support for that position. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Traditional Marriage: Still Worth 
Defending, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. ____ (2004); Richard Wilkins, Constitutional Status of Marriage; and 
Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Augustinian Goods of Marriage: The Disappearing Cornerstone of the 
American Law of Marriage, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. ____ (2004) (all papers presented at this 
Symposium). By contrast, those who support expansion of marriage status to other intimate adult 
relationships, suggest that restriction of marital status to just adult intimate relationships between 
biologically born males and biologically born females is at worst, nonsensical. See Terry Kogan, 
Transsexuals, Intersexuals, and Same-Sex Marriage, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. ____ (2004) (paper 
presented at this Symposium). By contrast, recognition of other sorts of legal status besides 
marriage, and/or conferral of legal benefits on same-sex couples, occasionally finds points of 
agreement. For instance, in response to the descriptions of important kinship relations I describe 
herein, my co-panelist Richard Wilkins agreed that legal recognition of other sorts of kin 
relationships might make some sense. However, Professor Wilkins continued to insist that marriage 
itself should still be reserved to opposite sex couples, as well as be the only legally recognized locale 
for sexual intimacy. His latter proposed restriction, that sexual intimacy be reserved to married 
couples (i.e., only opposite sex couples), not surprisingly gained no consensus between otherwise 
opposed discussants at this Symposium. 
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debate state the question as one of identity and at times, even of 
survival.11 
This article focuses on the Supreme Court’s definitions of family in 
the kinship cases, those cases that deal with various aspects of intimate 
human relationships including procreation-related issues, sexual 
intimacy, or otherwise. Additionally, kinship cases deal with 
relationships between adults and children, such as parental rights 
concerning education of one’s children, unmarried fathers’ rights vis-à-
vis their children, or foster parents’ rights concerning foster or potential 
adoptive children. A final set of kinship cases deal with other kin ties, 
such as between grandparents and children.12 This articles also focuses 
on exploring sociologists’ and cultural anthropologists’ documentation of 
competing descriptions of kinship practices and beliefs in the U.S., and 
contrasts them with the picture drawn by the Court and in congressional 
and state legislation regulating families.13 Not only are Americans’ 
kinship practices and beliefs varied and complex, they also suggest that 
views on and practices related to marriage itself are similarly complex, 
sometimes forming the central organizing relationship in a family, and 
sometimes not. This analysis reveals that the rhetoric in the Court’s 
substantive due process kinship opinions about the historical centrality of 
 
 11. It is primarily those who argue against same-sex marriage who pitch it as a matter of 
survival; that allowing same-sex marriage will destroy the institution of marriage altogether. The 
issue of survival is, of course, ultimately an empirical one. The power of such a claim, however, is 
that waiting to see whether or not it is accurate (that the institution of marriage will crumble with its 
inclusion of same-sex couples) means that it may be too late once those making this argument are 
proven right. Those arguing for expansion of marriage to same-sex couples occasionally discuss it as 
a survival issue, but more often focus primarily on it as a question of identity, human rights and 
respect. With respect to whether same-sex couples will continue to form (albeit a circumscribed 
existence) absent legal recognition of and protection for same-sex relationships, the evidence in 
some sense is already in – same-sex couples have been formed and existed with varying degrees of 
stability throughout the ages, just as opposite sex couples have. See, e.g., JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX 
UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE (1994); HIDDEN FROM HISTORY: RECLAIMING THE GAY AND 
LESBIAN PAST (M. Duberman, M. Vicinus & G. Chauncey, Jr. eds., 1989). Identity, respect, and 
human rights claims, however, aim at the fact that gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered peoples’ 
full existence and identity are limited due to the lack of legal recognition of same-sex relationships. 
 12. See C. Quince Hopkins, Lessons from Cultural Anthropology: The Supreme Court’s 
Kinship Cases Revisited (manuscript on file with the author). 
 13. Id. My scholarship takes inspiration from William Eskridge’s throughtful probing of the 
historical meanings of sodomy regulation. See William Eskridge, Hardwick and Historiography, 
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 631 (1999) (critiquing the Court’s historical research in Bowers). Eskridge’s 
work on this issue is cited by both the majority and dissent in Lawrence, with both citing it in 
support of its position in the case. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475-84 (majority’s discussion), and 
at 2488-98 (dissent’s discussion). See also, Anna Goldstein, Note, History, Homosexuality, and 
Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L. J. 1073 
(1988) (same); Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court’s Uses 
of History, 13 J.L. & POL. 809 (1997) (outlining the court’s long standing tradition of selectively 
reading history in order to produce the desired result); John G. Wofford, The Blinding Light: The 
Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 CHI. L. REV. 502 (1964) (focusing on the use of 
history to determine original intent). 
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marriage as a basis for other family related rights should be interrogated 
if and when the Court is faced with the question of same-sex marriage. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S KINSHIP DOCTRINE 
Many of the Supreme Court’s family or kinship cases rest on 
substantive Due Process and fundamental rights analyses to reach 
conclusions about which family-related relationships, structures, and 
conduct are accorded Constitutional protection.14 The Court has 
announced various rules for determining what does and does not 
constitute a fundamental right triggering protection, and scholars like 
David Meyer and others have done their best to make coherent what 
continues to remain a somewhat muddy doctrinal swamp.15 One standard 
characterization of the doctrinal swamp is that only those practices that 
are rooted in our nation’s traditions or implicit in concepts of ordered 
liberty warrant protection. 
Two related aspects at work within doctrinal swamp are exposing the 
complexity of historic practices and meanings related to families, and 
exploring the notion that “ordered liberty” means something more than 
that we are socially (and thus legally) cemented in the historic social 
practices. This article focus on the first, the complexity of kinship 
practices as they are described by cultural anthropologists and 
sociologists. The second issue is addressed in another article.16 
The purpose of this article is to problematize the dicta about 
marriage as the core human relationship that appears in the Court’s 
kinship cases, beginning with Reynolds v. United States,17 in which the 
Court upheld bans on Mormon polygamy in the face of free-exercise of 
religion claims.18 The broad-sweeping Reynolds rhetoric about the 
centrality of marriage to all social and political intercourse continues to 
reverberate through most of its family law cases since Reynolds was 
 
 14. See Hopkins, supra note 12. See also, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Loving 
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (right to marry is protected under the due process clause of the 
14th Amendment); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131-32 (1989) (fundamental right to 
parent under the 14th Amendment overridden by state’s interest in protecting intact marriages). Some 
of the Court’s other kinship cases rest more squarely on equal protection analysis. Loving, for 
instance, could be argued was really a race-based equal protection claim. See Hopkins, supra note 
12. 
 15. See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 629 (3d ed. 1999) (The concept of fundamental rights remains vague 
today). 
 16. See Hopkins, supra note 12. 
 17. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 18. Id. 
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decided.19 The aim is not (necessarily) to destabilize marriage itself, but 
rather, to resituate it within a broader framework of kinship relationships 
as actually practiced in a variety of cultural groups in the United States. 
III. VARIETIES IN KINSHIP PRACTICES OF DIFFERENT CULTURAL 
GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES 
The particular historical and anthropological studies addressed in this 
article focus on several different cultural or ethnic sub-groups of 
Americans: 1) white urban middle-class Americans;20 2) Japanese-
Americans;21 3) Greek-Americans;22 4) the Navajo;23 and 5) low-income 
urban and rural African-American communities.24 Additionally, Lorri 
Glover’s study of 19th century South Carolinian slave-holding gentry 
family structures will be discussed.25 
Analysis of these accounts reveals a rich array of kinship practices, 
beliefs, and social meanings of those practices, which brings into 
question the Court’s determination of tradition, and thus protected family 
structures. Although traditional heterosexual marriage is present in 
kinship practices and beliefs of all of these cultural groups, marriage 
does not always play the primary and central role in Americans’ kinship 
structures that the Court states that it does in its kinship cases.26 Marriage 
in fact is often on a par with, sometimes secondary to, or occasionally 
even peripheral to other kin ties – whether they be mother/child (e.g., in 
the Navajo tradition), or sibling ties (e.g., in the traditions of South 
Carolina gentry). This suggests that if there is to be any Constitutional 
protection of kinship ties based specifically on historical and traditional 
practices, it needs to sweep more broadly than it does currently.27 It is 
thus important to incorporate these kinds of studies into our 
understanding of protected marital structures. 
 
 19. See Hopkins, supra note 12. The Reynolds rhetoric referred to here appears in Reynolds, 
98 U.S. at 164-65. 
 20. See infra note 35 and accompanying text discussing the work of David Schneider. 
 21. See infra note 31 and accompanying text discussing the work of anthropologist Sylvia 
Yanagisako. 
 22. See infra note 36 and accompanying text discussing the work of Phyllis Chock. 
 23. See infra note 52 and accompanying text discussing the work of Gary Witherspoon. 
 24. See infra note 62 and accompanying text discussing the work of Carol Stack. 
 25. These studies call into question Professor Adolphe’s claim to a monolithic 
anthropological picture, and thus justification for denying same-sex marriages. See Jane Adolphe, 
The Case Against Same-Sex Marriage in Canada: Law and Policy Considerations, 18 BYU J. PUB. 
L. ____ (2004) (paper presented at this Symposium). 
 26. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 
211 (1888); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 27. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (excluding from Constitutional 
protection a father’s biological and social relationship to his child, where the child was born to a 
woman while she was married to another man.) 
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A. Study Selection Criteria 
A number of the particular studies addressed herein were chosen 
because they begin with, and subsequently draw upon the work and 
intellectual tradition of David Schneider, a pioneer of the anthropological 
study of American kinship practices in non-Native American cultural 
groups. Schneider not only studied the external practices, but also the 
meanings ascribed to the kinship practices of those he studied.28 William 
Eskridge, and others, take a similar more probing look at the meanings 
behind overt legal regulation of human sexual conduct.29 This more 
nuanced understanding is picked up by Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
majority in Lawrence.30 Some of these studies also distinguish between 
the sociological and demographics of kinship, while others – such as 
Yanagisako’s work on Japanese-American kinship – insist that these two 
categories cannot be meaningfully separated.31 To the extent that they are 
analytically if not practically severable, the former 
sociological/demographic depiction of kinship consists of recounting 
actual kinship practices – in other words, how people in the world “cope 
with the facts of human reproduction.”32 The latter cultural systems of 
kinship is, in a sense, a normative construct insofar as it focuses on those 
aspects of kinship that seem to matter to those in the studies, and the 
meanings that they ascribe to those aspects regardless of whether or not 
these aspects of kinship are reflected in how the study subjects live their 
own lives.33 The sociological/demographics of kinship most directly 
 
 28. See SCHNEIDER, infra note 35. William Eskridge and others, take a similar approach in 
evaluating the legal regulation of sodomy. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 13. David Chambers, in his 
presentation for this Symposium, urges that we consider this kind of evidence when we talk about 
what is and what is not, when making claims related to the debate over same-sex marriage. 
 29. See, e.g., Eskridge, Hardwick and Historiography, supra note 13. 
 30. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct 2472, 2475-84 (2003). 
 31. SYLVIA JUNKO YANAGISAKO, TRANSFORMING THE PAST: TRADITION AND KINSHIP 
AMONG JAPANESE AMERICANS 13-17 (1985) (describing and critiquing Schneider’s insistence on 
focusing on cultural kinship to the exclusion of social kinship). In an earlier iteration of her thesis, 
Yanagisako starts from the perspective of Schneider’s bifurcation of these two categories, but then 
uses her study to show the problems with such an approach. See Sylvia Junko Yanagisako, Variance 
in American Kinship: Implications for Cultural Analysis, 5(1) AMERICAN ETHNOOLOGIST 15, 16 
(Feb. 1978). In her subsequent book-length description of her research, Yanagisako is explicit that 
her research includes both normative statements and descriptive accounts of her study subject’s 
actions in both the past and in the present. See also, Janet Dolgin, Choice, Tradition and the New 
Genetics: The Fragmentation of the Ideology of the Family, 32 CONN. L. REV. 523, n.113 
(describing Schneider as focusing on “the culture of American families and not their demography.”) 
My term “social kinship” would refer to demographics – and actual kinship practices. According to 
Dolgin, Schneider was “concerned with the symbols that defined families and with the family as a 
symbol. He did not suggest that actual families necessarily conformed to that model.” Id., citing 
SCHNEIDER, infra note 35 at 1-6. 
 32. YANAGISAKO, TRANSFORMING THE PAST, supra note 31 at 15. 
 33. Id. at 15-16. See also, Dolgin, supra note 31 at n.113. 
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confronts the Court’s statements that marriage in particular forms the 
central relation in U.S. kinship practices and thus forms the focus of 
analysis.34 The latter, cultural kinship, dovetails more nearly with some 
members of the Court’s implicit claim that statutory enactments reflect 
majoritarian beliefs about what regulation of which family and kinship 
relations should look like. 
B. The Studies: Kinship in the U.S. 
The following studies were chosen because they comply with the 
rubric set forth in Section A. In addition, a wide variety of social and 
ethnic groups were chosen to highlight the different relationships 
emphasized in each grouping; that is, emphasize that this study is not just 
based on one analysis of a single group, but rather, a variety of groups. 
1. White, urban, middle-class Americans 
David Schneider initiated the investigation of American kinship 
practices beginning in the late 1960s. The informants in his primary 
study were white, urban, middle-class Americans residing in the 
Midwestern United States.35 Schneider came to several conclusions in his 
research. First, as discussed above, Schneider noted the distinction 
between social and cultural kinship systems.36 Second, Schneider found, 
among the group he studied, that blood served as a symbol of shared bio-
genetic substance.37 Third, as discussed above, Schneider identified as a 
central notion of American kinship concepts, something he termed 
“diffuse enduring solidarity.”38 Fourth and finally, Schneider concluded 
from his research that marriage and reproduction form the core of 
American kinship.39 
Twelve years after he published his study, however, his own doctoral 
students challenged his conclusion that his informant group characterized 
all American kinship practices.40 Schneider agreed that the conclusion of 
 
 34. See, e.g., cases in supra note 26. 
 35. See DAVID SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT (1968, 1980). 
 36. See generally, ROBERT PARKIN, KINSHIP: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE BASIC CONCEPTS 
(1997). 
 37. SCHNEIDER, supra note 35. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. See also my critique of one legal academic’s adoption of this earlier broad conclusion 
of David Schneider’s without reference to Schneider’s subsequent caveat. Q. Hopkins, supra note 12 
at n.15 and accompanying text, referencing David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional 
Dilemma of the Faultless Father, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 810 (1999) and discussing Meyer’s reference 
to Schneider in support of the idea that social norms map onto legal norms, but without Schneider’s 
subsequent caveat about its restriction to the group studied. 
 40. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 35 at 121-22. 
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his earlier research on the centrality of marriage and reproduction to 
American kinship practices and beliefs could not necessarily be 
extrapolated from the subjects of his study white, urban, middle-class 
Americans to other cultural groups in the United States.41 The remainder 
of the studies discussed herein expand on Schneider’s original study of 
U.S. kinship to other cultural groups in the U.S. 
2. Japanese American kinship 
Sylvia Yanigasako, also a Schneider protégé,42 drew upon his work 
in her research on Japanese Americans’ kinship structures.43 In her work, 
Yanigasako finds that the kinship ties in Japanese-American families are 
particularly broad. For instance, one’s sibling’s in-laws are considered 
family, despite the complete lack of actual blood or affinial tie, as are 
one’s sibling’s spouse’s siblings (otherwise known as one’s 
consanguine’s affine’s consanguines).44 Further, in looking at the 
practice of koden (the exchange of mortuary offerings), Yanagisako 
found that friends and acquaintances not related by blood or marriage, 
even in the most attenuated form, take on aspects of kin relations through 
the system of koden obligation.45 The Japanese-American concept of 
family, therefore, exists beyond even what the Court recognized as 
important familial ties in both Moore v. City of East Cleveland46 and 
recently in Troxel v. Granville,47 arguably the Court’s most generous 
case in terms of an expansive definition of family. This Japanese-
American conception of kinship further separates notions of kinship from 
purely biological or affinial ties.48 
 
 41. Id. As Schneider puts it: “[He] did make some very bad mistakes” in this central 
assumption. Schneider notes that anthropological studies that he conducted since his first study 
demonstrate that the meaning of “family” is different for different class groups in the United States. 
Id. at 122. For instance, the notion of co-residence as a critical symbol or marker of family is 
significantly lower in lower class families than for middle class families. Id. He also notes that 
Sylvia Yanagisako and Phyllis Chock’s work on immigrant communities, discussed in this article, 
further demonstrate the fallacy of his conclusion that ethnicity “does not matter.” Id. 
 42. See, e.g., NATURALIZING POWER: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST CULTURAL ANALYSIS IX (1995). 
 43. See YANAGISAKO, TRANSFORMING THE PAST, supra note 31 at 13-20 (1985). 
 44. Yanagisako, Variance in American Kinship, supra note 31 at 17. 
 45. Id. at 18-21. 
 46. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
 47. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (in effect extending recognition of the 
grandparent-grandchild connection as a family tie protected under the Constitution). 
 48. Yanagisako, Variance in American Kinship, supra note 31 at 17. 
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3. Greek-American spiritual kinship 
Phyllis Chock also works in the tradition of David Schneider, 
investigating the kinship practices of Greek-Americans.49 Chock finds 
that the spiritual bonds that develop in Greek-American cultural groups 
can rank as important as biological and marital ties, and that they take on 
qualities typically reserved to kin ties.50 For instance, a sexual 
relationship between those whose bond was spiritual, such as between a 
godparent and a godchild, is considered taboo just as an incestuous 
relationship between parent and child, or between siblings, would be 
taboo in a traditional kin relationship.51 To the extent that spiritual 
kinship of this variety reflects varieties such as incest prohibitions 
typically restricted to blood and affinial ties that are symbolic of these 
more traditional of kinship, Chock’s findings continue to force us to 
broaden our notions of kin ties. 
4. The Navajo 
Gary Witherspoon, a Schneider protégé, directed his attention to the 
kinship practices of the Navajo. Although the Navajo are one of the most 
studied of cultural groups in the United States, Witherspoon’s work 
applied a Schneiderian approach, looking at current social kinship 
practices and the meanings ascribed to those practices by his Navajo 
informants.52 What Witherspoon revealed in his research was that within 
Navajo kinship beliefs and practices, the primary kin tie is that between 
mother and child, rather than the one between spouses.53 Marriage – 
defined as cohabitation and sexual intercourse – is significant, but it is 
considered a “weak and insecure” relationship in contrast with the 
 
 49. See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 35 at 122. 
 50. Phyllis Pease Chock, Time, Nature, and Spirit: A Symbolic Analysis of Greek-American 
Spiritual Kinship, 1(1) AMERICAN ETHNOOLOGIST 33 (Feb. 1974). See generally, Parkin, supra note 
36 at 124-25 (describing the differences between pseudo-kinship, ritual or spiritual kinship, and 
fictive kinship). 
 51. See Chock, Time, Nature, and Spirit, supra note 50 at 41. 
 52. See GARY WITHERSPOON, NAVAJO KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE (1975). The term 
“informant” refers to those among the cultural group with whom an anthropologist directly collects 
data. Although not Navajo himself, Witherspoon married a Navajo woman, and lived on the Navajo 
Reservation; this rendered him less of an outsider which facilitated his research. For this reason, his 
research on Navajo kinship is one of the few studies to actually be cited with approval by the Navajo 
Supreme Court. See Daniel L. Lowery, Developing a Tribal Common Law Jurisprudence: The 
Navajo Experience, 1969-1992, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 379, 395 n.91 and accompanying text (1993) 
(noting the Navajo court’s historical distrust of studies of Navajos conducted by non-Navajos, but 
citing to Witherspoon’s determination that a child traditionally is placed with the mother upon 
divorce). 
 53. WITHERSPOON, supra note 52 at 21, 30-31. 
10HOPKINS.MACRO 5/26/2004  1:04 AM 
674 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 18 
“strong and secure mother-child relationship.”54 Further, to the extent 
marriage is particularly significant, it is because it establishes a tie 
between father and child.55 That is, a father’s kin relationship runs 
through the child’s mother, and attaches to the father by virtue of the 
father’s marriage to the mother, rather than flowing directly from father 
to child. Should the marriage end,56 the father’s kinship relationship to 
his child is severed as well.57 
This kind of kinship structure, would, in one view, accord with the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,58 in which the 
Court determined that when a child is born to a woman during her 
marriage to a man not the child’s father, the non-marital but biological 
father’s relationship to his biological child is preempted by the marital 
relationship between the marital but non-biological father and the child’s 
biological mother.59 In this way, the father of the child in Michael H. is 
the person who is married to her mother; this characterization in turn 
reflects a valuation of marriage over other ties such as biological ones. 
Interestingly, the Navajo Supreme Court, when faced with a 
custodial claim by a non-Navajo Native American mother against a 
Navajo father, sidestepped its own kinship tradition of preference for 
mother/child bond and of fathers losing kin ties to their children upon 
divorce, by asserting a different cultural kinship tradition that the Court 
determined overrode it.60 This different tradition was one which 
recognized a child’s ties to the full tribal community. Awarding custody 
of the child to the non-Navajo mother would thus sever these 
traditionally recognized kinship ties between child and community, a 
result the Navajo Supreme Court would not countenance.61 
 
 54. Id. at 28. 
 55. Id. at 34-35. 
 56. Witherspoon notes the traditional Navajo method of divorcing is for the wife to place the 
husband’s personal belongings on the doorstep of their dwelling. Witherspoon, supra note 52. 
Contemporary Navajo divorce practices in tribal court are similar to, although not identical with, 
Anglo divorce practice. 
 57. WITHERSPOON, supra note 52 at 30-31. (“[I]t is the marriage of the father to the mother 
which ties the father to his children. When the marriage is dissolved, the father-child relationship is 
behaviorally and functionally dissolved, or almost so.”) 
 58. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 59. Id. at 131-32. 
 60. Goldtooth v. Goldtooth, 3 Navajo Rptr. 223 (Window Rock D. Ct. 1982). See also, 
Barbara Ann Atwood, Tribal Jurisprudence and Cultural Meanings of the Family, 79 NEB. L. REV. 
577, 611-613 (2000) (discussing Goldtooth). 
 61. Atwood, supra note 60. 
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5. African-American kinship 
Anthropologist Carol Stack investigates present-day rural and urban 
African-Americans’ kinship networks in her work.62 Unlike other 
researchers, Stack’s particular focus is on a particular socio-economic 
group within the larger cultural group of African-Americans. Within the 
group she studied, lower-income African-Americans, Stack identifies 
extended care-giving networks for children that are sometimes, but not 
always linked by biological, genetic, or marital ties. In other words, if 
one looks at the Court’s conception of parent-child rights flowing from 
the baseline institution of marriage such as in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 
Stack’s research demonstrates that these bonds between children and 
extended family in lower-income African-Americans in practice have 
little if anything to do with some pre-existing marital tie. By placing 
marriage at the center of family-related rights, as the Court has done, it 
insures displacement of these particular kinship care networks outside 
the scope of Constitutional protection. 
Stack’s finding on this point has been replicated by others, notably 
Herbert Gutman, who describes conceptions of quasi-and non-kin social 
obligations where children (including fictive ones) are cared for by a 
network of surrogate caregivers of friends and extended family 
members.63 Not only would the bulk of the Court’s kinship cases not 
recognize these extended kin and kin-like ties, neither would some Acts 
of Congress such as the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”);64 the 
FMLA would deny benefits and protection for these types of family 
structures, and thus favors their white counterparts, who are more likely 
to use affinial and biological relatives as caregivers.65 Stack also reveals 
that co-residence is not necessarily a marker of family ties within low-
income African-American cultural groups. Instruments such as the 
United States Census, would thus exclude from its results a large number 
of functioning rural and urban poor African-American families as not 
falling within its narrow definition of family. 
 
 62. CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRUGGLES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK COMMUNITY 
(1975). 
 63. PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES 
(1997) (analyzing Herbert Gutman’s research). 
 64. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 - 2654 (2000). 
 65. ORLANDO PATTERSON, RITUALS OF BLOOD, notes that this phenomenon today directly 
results from the profound impact of slavery on present-day African-American families, and in 
particular impact African-American men’s role in families. ORLANDO PATTERSON, RITUALS OF 
BLOOD (1998). Is the fact that family structure in present-day African-American families is in fact a 
remaining construct of slavery a reason to discount its legitimacy or factual existence today? 
Certainly the answer must be no. 
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Finally, Stack’s research exposes several additional particular 
kinship elements of her African-American informants’ group. First, 
Stack notes a distinction between social fathers and genitor fathers, 
perhaps a practice consistent with Michael H. v. Gerald D. just as Navajo 
kinship practices might be. Also, Stack identifies a kinship practice in 
this cultural group where a father’s tie to his natal family is particularly 
strong, sometimes enough to override his tie to his biological children. 
This particular strength of natal family ties might yield a different focus 
if adopted by the Court; that is, a focus on a child’s powerful tie to his or 
her natal family may somewhat undercut the notion that the marital bond 
is paramount. It also would suggest a clearer protection for children’s 
rights (as opposed to children’s rights as derivative of parents’ rights), 
and thus a broader protection for a child’s ties to multiple kin units. This 
latter conception would contradict the holding in Michael H., that a child 
could have more than one father. Finally, Stack’s research suggests that a 
mother’s tie may sometimes be stronger to her latter born children than 
to her first born;66 in this structure of kin ties, an aunt or grandparent 
might take on a social parent role more often, and thus might suggest a 
sufficiently strong traditional practice that it should warrant 14th 
Amendment protection.67 
6. Kinship bonds of early South Carolina gentry 
Although the prior anthropological studies focus on modern day 
kinship practices, it is also the case that historical practices are more 
complex than the Court’s cases would suggest. The recent historical 
research by Lorri Glover on the kinship bonds of early South Carolina 
slaveholding gentry during the century and a half prior to the ratification 
of the Fourteenth Amendment presents one example of a more nuanced 
description of historical kinship ties a different understanding of kinship 
ties than that discussed by the Court, one where marriage and parent-
child relations do not necessarily form the core kin tie. 
In her research, Glover finds that brothers, sisters and the extended 
family formed the foundation on which South Carolina gentry built their 
emotional and social (and economic) worlds.68 As described by the 
publisher, 
 
 66. See, e.g., STACK, supra note 62 at 46-49. 
 67. See STACK, supra note 62. Again, these variations in kinship practice also suggest 
possible disparate treatment under Congressional acts such as the Family and Medical Leave Act or 
the United States Census. 
 68. LORRI GLOVER, ALL OUR RELATIONS: BLOOD TIES AND EMOTIONAL BONDS AMONG 
THE EARLY SOUTH CAROLINA GENTRY (2000). 
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Adopting a cooperative, interdependent attitude, and paying little 
attention to [otherwise then prevalent] gendered notions of power, 
siblings served one another as surrogate parents, mentors, friends, 
confidants, and life-long allies. “Elite women and men” simultaneously 
used those sibling ties to advance their interests at the expense of 
unrelated rivals.69 
 
Under this account, marriage ties existed, but they operate almost 
like wallpaper. Marriage ties are in the background of, but not central to 
the lives of these people. It was a similar situation with parent-child ties: 
they existed, but ultimately the sibling bond overrode the inter-
generational bond in importance. 
Glover’s research on early South Carolina gentry thus challenges 
deeply held assumptions about United States families, at least white, 
propertied families, in the eighteenth century. In particular, her work 
undercuts the Supreme Court’s often-repeated tenet that marriage 
historically and traditionally formed the central and fundamental core of 
family structure in the United States. On the other hand, Glover’s 
research does suggest that the genetic tie between siblings does play a 
central role in the lives of early slaveholding South Carolinians. Her 
research thus further suggests that protection of those sibling bonds, such 
as in a case that might present questions of a child’s interest in sibling 
adoption or in a split custody case might be something the Court should 
see as justified based on historical practices standing separate and apart 
from a marital relationship. That is, if the Court does rely on history and 
tradition to support such an expansion of Constitutional protection to 
some family ties, her research suggest it could do so even if it abandons 
marriage as the central construct upon which all family-related rights 
rest. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
These accounts reveal a rich array of kinship practices, beliefs, and 
social meanings of those practices. Therefore, the Court’s determination 
of tradition, and thus the parameters of protected family structures is very 
problematic. Although traditional heterosexual marriage is present in 
kinship practices and beliefs of all of these cultural groups, marriage 
does not necessarily always play the deep, primary, and central role in all 
Americans’ kinship structures as the Court suggests in its kinship cases. 
Marriage in fact is sometimes on a co-equal footing and at other 
times even a secondary footing to other kinship bonds B whether they be 
 
 69. Id. (cover jacket) 
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mother/child (e.g., in the Navajo tradition), or spiritual ties (e.g., in the 
Greek-American tradition), or sibling ties (e.g., in the traditions of South 
Carolina gentry). This suggests that if the Court’s Constitutional 
substantive due process protection of kinship ties more generally is to be 
based on historical and traditional practices, it needs to move away from 
its grounding in the marital tie, but it also needs to sweep more broadly 
than it does currently. It is thus important to incorporate these kinds of 
studies into our understanding of protected kinship structures more 
generally. And, to the extent that marriage itself need not undergird other 
family-related Constitutional rights this further enables us to analyze it as 
a separate and independent right worthy of considering on its own 
Constitutional merits, without the deeper fear of dissolving the plethora 
of rights that the Court has to date found only derivative of that basic 
right. 
Further, however, these studies suggest that our measurement of the 
right to marry standing on its own needs to take into consideration the 
complexity of the meaning of marriage not only in different cultural 
groups but also the complexity of its meaning within any particular 
cultural group, including within the majority culture; further, such an 
assessment must take into account the extent to which its meaning might 
change over time. State v. Lawrence puts this last issue front and center. 
In Lawrence, the court was obviously faced with the question of whether 
over a decade of statutory and social change were sufficient to warrant 
overturning its prior privacy decision in Bowers v. Hardwick. The 
Lawrence court determined that it was. But further, the Lawrence 
majority revisited and rejected the prior description in Bowers of what 
were historical legal practices with respect to regulation of sodomy. 
Lawrence may also open the door (as Scalia in dissent notes) for 
expanding the right to government recognition of non-heterosexual adult 
intimate relationships. The Lawrence Court’s more careful review of the 
deeper meaning and import of earlier juridical and legislative 
pronouncements on sodomy regulation, which necessitated overruling 
Bowers v. Hardwick, suggests a court that is more willing to do more 
than superficially evaluate regulation of adult intimate relationships 
when it reviews the issue of government recognition and the social 
meaning of adult intimate relationships in the context of the same-sex 
marriage debate. 
Whether one draws the line on the requisite longevity (50 years or 
200) and robustness (consistent representation of the tradition in legal or 
social norms) of the particular tradition at issue as long or short, there of 
course arises a need for an analytical framework to cabin the Court’s 
determination of tradition’s demands. Since the question of tradition 
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(whether recent or ancient) and thus the substantive due process rubric is 
primarily descriptive and empirical rather than normative, the Court 
should look, at least in part, to descriptive accounts of kinship practices, 
and the beliefs or social meaning of those practices. Cultural 
anthropologists, sociologists, and historians, provide some of these 
descriptive accounts. The picture they reveal is much more rich than 
statutory enactments and the Court’s decisions imply, both in terms of 
actual kinship practices and in the meanings of those kinship relations to 
Americans. The rhetoric in the Court’s substantive due process kinship 
opinions about the historical centrality of marriage as a basis for other 
family related rights should be interrogated if and when the Court is 
faced with the question of same-sex marriage.70 
Finally, however, what might this broader sweep look like? If Greek-
American culture gives precedence to spiritual ties, does that suggest 
that, for Greek-Americans only, governments should be compelled to 
give to a person’s spiritual family members analogous privileges to those 
extended to spouses? Or, more broadly, not just to Greek-Americans, but 
to all Americans, should governments be compelled to give protections 
to any person who has a spiritual tie to another person comparable to the 
tie that a Greek-American might have? 
One possible preliminary step is to focus on marriage itself. For the 
vast majority of Americans, both gay and straight, it seems fair to say 
that marriage is indeed special. Protecting the ability to marry the person 
you love merits constitutional protection because it falls within the 
notion of liberty – or, as Nussbaum would phrase it, human flourishing. 
In addition, however, what the foregoing inquiry shows, if nothing else, 
is that some other sorts of relationships are also extremely important to 
many groups and our legislatures – if not the Courts – need to be more 
sensitive to that fact. 
 
 
 70. The more extreme outcome of that analysis could be overturning Loving and Zablocki, 
and perhaps all of its substantive due process cases on parenting and contraception including but not 
limited to Michael H. v. Gerald D. and Griswold v. Connecticut. Even Kennedy won’t go that far, I 
propose. The question, then, is what can/should the Court do with same-sex marriage, if the history 
and tradition of traditional marriage is not so plain? Rehnquist for the majority in Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (looking to Canadian practices on physician assisted suicide) and 
Kennedy for the majority in Lawrence (looking to the European Court of Human Rights on the issue 
of sodomy) both cite to other countries’ practices and holdings in reaching their decisions might 
suggest that the Court is moving towards a recognition that we live in a global society and that the 
future is not provinciality. 
